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Abstract. In various situations decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in
the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We consider a setting where the two forecasters provide
their advice repeatedly and ask whether the decision maker can learn to compare and rank the two forecasters based
on past performance. We take an axiomatic approach and propose three natural axioms that a comparison test should
comply with. We propose a test that complies with our axioms. Perhaps, not surprisingly, this test is closely related to
the likelihood ratio of the two forecasts over the realized sequence of events. More surprisingly, this test is essentially
unique. Using results on the rate of convergence of supermartingales we show that whenever the two experts’ advice
are sufficiently distinct the proposed test will detect the informed expert in any desired degree of precision in some
fixed finite time.
JEL classification: C11, C70, C73, D83.
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1 Introduction
Consider an individual who repeatedly consults two weather forecasting websites. It is reasonable to ask what
should the individual do when the two forecasts repeatedly contradict. In what way can the individual rank
the two? Should the individual trust one site and (eventually) ignore the other?
The weather example above serves as a metaphor for a plethora of settings where a decision maker faces
conflicting expert advice. Take for example an elected official who must rely on professional input from civil
servants, a patient who receives prognosis from various doctors, or, more abstractly, a learning algorithmmech-
anism that uses input from various sources.
In this paper we set the stage for defining the notion of a cardinal comparison test. The setting we have in
mind is a sequential one. At each stage two forecasters provide a probability over some future event (e.g., the
occurrence of rain) and then the event is either realized or its complement is. Before the next day’s forecasts
the test must rank the two forecasters. We calibrate these ranks so they add up to one. One way to think of the
rank is a recommendation for a coin flip to decide which of the two experts’ advice should be taken.
We pursue a test that complies with the following set of properties which we consider natural:
Anonymity - A test is anonymous if it does not depend on the identity of the agents but only on their
forecasts.
Error-free - A test is error-free if from the perspective of each of the expert, he cannot entertain the thought
that the other expert will be overwhelmingly preferred. Another way to think about a notion of an error-free
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test is to assume that one of the experts has the correct model. In such a case the test will surely not point at
the second expert as the superior one.
Reasonable - Let us consider an event, A, that has positive probability according to the first expert but
relatively small probability according to the second. Conditional on the occurrence of the event A, a reasonable
test must assign positive probability to the first expert being better informed than the second.
One thing to emphasize about the comparison test we pursue and the related properties is that they are
not designed to evaluate whether any of the two forecasters is correct in some objective sense. They are only
designed to compare the two. To make this point assume that Nature follows a fair coin for deciding on rain
and one forecaster insists on forecasting rain with probability 60% while the other insists on 10%. While both
are wrong, a comparison test should somehow gravitate towards the former one as being better.
There is a large body of literature on expert testing that studies the question of whether a self-proclaimed
expert is a true expert or a charlatan (see Section 1.2 for more details) and many of the results point to the
difficulty or impossibility of designing such tests that are immune to strategic forecasters.
A comparison test may often be a more natural question than the one on whether the forecaster is correct.
Indeed, when a decision maker must act then he must choose which of the experts to follow. In the case of
a single expert the dismissal of that expert leaves the decision maker working with her own unsubstantiated
beliefs, which may lead to an even worse outcome. In case a decision maker faces two forecasters with con-
flicting input he may choose to somehow aggregate the two instead of dismissing one or the other. We discuss
this alternative line of research in Section 1.2.
1.1 Results
Given an ordered pair of forecasters, f and g, at any finite time t we consider the corresponding likelihood
ratio of the actual outcome and calibrate it so that it and its inverse add up to one. We call this the finite
derivative test at time t. We prove that this test is anonymous, error-free and reasonable. Furthermore, module
an equivalence relation, it is unique. In fact, for any test that differs from the aforementioned construction and
which is anonymous and reasonable there exist two forecasters which render the test not error-free.
More over, our constructed test perfectly identifies the correct forecaster whenever the two measures in-
duced by the forecasters are mutually singular with respect to each other. Requiring the test to identify the
correct expert when the measures are not mutually singular is shown to be impossible.
A test could potentially take a long while until it converges to a verdict on the better expert. We show that
the proposed comparison test converges fast and uniformly. In fact, when disregarding the stages at which the
two experts provide similar forecasts, then with high probability the correct verdict will emerge in finite time
that is independent of the underlying probabilities.
One can ask whether ideal tests can exist, that is tests that always rank the correct forecaster higher regard-
less of what forecasting strategies other experts might submit. Unfortunately, this turns out to be impossible,
as we discuss in Appendix A. Since an ideal test does not exist, it is natural to explore the ideality of a test
over a limited class of data generating processes. We provide a full characterization for the existence of ideal
tests over sets by showing that an ideal test with respect to a set A exists if and only if, A is a pairwise mutually
singular.
1.2 Related literature
Single expert testing. A substantial part of the literature on expert testing focuses on the single expert setting.
This literature dates back to the seminal paper of (Dawid, 1982), who proposes the calibration test as a means
to evaluate a forecaster (in particular a weather forecaster) and shows that a true expert will never fail this test.
(Foster and Vohra, 1998) show how a charlatan, who has no knowledge of the weather, can produce forecasts
which are always calibrated. The basic ingredient that allows the charlatan to fool the test is the use of random
forecasts. (Lehrer, 2001) and (Sandroni et al., 2003) extend this observation to a broader class of calibration-
like tests. Finally, (Sandroni, 2003) shows that there exists no error-free test that is immune to such random
charlatans (see also extensions of Sandroni’s result in (Shmaya, 2008) and (Olszewski and Sandroni, 2008).
To circumvent the negative results various authors suggest to limit the set of models for which the test must
be error-free (e.g., (Al-Najjar et al., 2010) and (Pomatto, 2016)), or to limit the computational power associ-
ated with the charlatan (e.g., (Fortnow and Vohra, 2009)) or to replace measure theoretic implausibility with
topological implausibility by resorting to the notion of category one sets (e.g., (Dekel and Feinberg, 2006)).
Multiple expert testing. Comparing performance of two (or more) experts gained very little attention in
the literature. Apart from our previous work we are only familiar with (Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2008). That
paper proposes a test based on the likelihood ratio for comparing two experts. They show that if one expert
knows the true process whereas the other is uninformed, then one of the following must occur: either, the test
correctly identifies the informed expert, or the forecasts made by the uninformed expert are close to those made
by the informed one. It turns out that the test they propose is anonymous and reasonable but is not error-free
(please refer to Section 5 for the formal definition).
Another approach, was suggested by (Feinberg and Stewart, 2008), who study an infinite-horizon model
of testing multiple experts, using a cross-calibration test. In their test N experts are tested simultaneously;
each expert is tested according to a calibration restricted to dates where not only does the expert have a fixed
forecast but the other experts also have a fixed forecast, possibly with different values. That is to say, where the
calibration test checks the empirical frequency of observed outcomes conditional on each forecast, the cross-
calibration test checks the empirical frequency of observed outcomes conditional on each profile of forecasts
(please refer to Appendix C for the formal definition).
They showed that if an expert predicts according to the data-generating process, the expert is guaranteed to
pass the cross-calibration test with probability 1, no matter what strategies the other experts use. In addition,
they prove that in the presence of an informed expert, the subset of data-generating processes under which
an ignorant expert (a charlatan) will pass the cross-calibration test with positive probability, is topologically
“small”.
In a previous paper, (Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017), we construct a comparison test over the infinite-
horizon. In that paper the test outputs one verdict at the end of all times which is one of three forms - either
it points to one of the forecasters as advantageous or it is indecisive. The main result in that paper was the
identification of an essentially unique infinite-horizon ordinal test that adheres with some natural properties.
The properties studied in the current paper are inspired by the ones studies in (Kavaler and Smorodinsky,
2017). The test we identify is based on the likelihood ratio. Interestingly, the tests identified in (Al-Najjar et al.,
2010) and that identified by (Pomatto, 2016) for testable paradigms are also based on the likelihood ratio.
An alternative approach to that of comparing and ranking experts is that of aggregating forecasts by a
non-Bayesian aggregator. For aggregation schemes that do well in a single stage setting see (Arieli et al., 2018)
as well as (Levy and Razin, 2018a), and (Levy and Razin, 2018b), and for schemes that work well in a repeated
setting and produce small regret see the rich literature in machine learning surveyed in (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,
2006).
2 Model
At the beginning of each period t = 1,2, . . . an outcome,ωt , drawn randomly by Nature from the setΩ = {0,1},
is realized.1 A realization is an infinite sequence of outcomes, ω := {ω1,ω2, . . .} ∈ Ω
∞. We denote by ωt :=
{ω1,ω2, . . . ,ωt} to be the prefix of length t of ω (sometimes referred to as the partial history of outcomes up
to period t) and use the convention that ω0 := ;. At the risk of abusing notation we will also use ωt to denote
the cylinder set {ωˆ ∈ Ω∞ : ωˆt =ωt}. In other words, ωt will also denote the set of realizations which share a
common prefix of length t. For any t we denote by gt the σ-algebra on Ω
∞ generated by the cylinder sets ωt
and let g∞ := σ(
∞⋃
t=0
gt) denote the smallest σ-algebra which consists of all cylinders (also known as the Borel
σ-algebra). Let ∆(Ω∞) be the set of all probability measures defined over the measurable space (Ω∞, g∞).
Before ωt is realized, two self-proclaimed experts (sometimes referred to as forecasters) simultaneously
announce their forecast in the form of a probability distribution over Ω. Let (Ω×∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))t be the set of
all sequences composed of realizations and pairs of forecasts made up to time t and let
⋃
t≥0
(Ω×∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))t
be the set of all such finite sequences.
A (pure) forecasting strategy f is a function that maps finite histories to a probability distribution over Ω.
Formally, f :
⋃
t≥0
(Ω×∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))t −→ ∆(Ω). Note that each forecast provided by one expert may depend,
inter alia, on those provided by the other expert in previous stages. Let F denote the set of all forecasting
strategies. Hereinafter we will typically use f , g to denote forecasting strategies and by f to denote a pair of
forecasting strategies. Namely, typically f = ( f , g).
A probability measure P ∈∆(Ω∞) naturally induces a corresponding forecasting strategy, denoted fP , that
satisfies for all ω ∈ Ω∞ and for all t such that P(ωt) > 0,
fP(ω
t , ·, ·)[ωt+1] = P(ωt+1|ω
t).
Thus, the forecasting strategy fP derives its forecasts from the original measure, P, via Bayes rule. Note that
this is not uniquely defined as it does not restrict the forecast of fP over cylinders, ω
t , for which P(ωt) = 0.
1 For expository reasons we restrict attention to a binary set Ω= {0,1}. The results extend to any finite set.
In the other direction, a realization ω, and an ordered pair of forecasting strategies, f , induce a unique
play path, (ω, f ) ∈ (Ω ×∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))∞, where the corresponding t - history is denoted by (ω, f )t ∈ (Ω ×
∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))t started at the Null history, (ω, f )0 := ;. Hence, in turn, f induces a pair of probability measures,
denoted for simplicity by ( f , g), over Ω∞, as follows:
f (ωt) =
t∏
n=1
f ((ω, f )n−1)[ωn], g(ω
t) =
t∏
n=1
g((ω, f )n−1)[ωn].
By Kolomogorov’s extension theorem the above is sufficient in order to derive the whole measure. Observe
that a pair of forecasting strategies induces a pair of probability measures, whereas each single forecasting
strategy does not induce a single measure due to the dependency between the two forecasters.
2.1 A cardinal comparison test
At each stage, t, a third party (the ‘tester’) who observes the forecasts and outcomes compares the performance
of both forecasters and decides who she thinks is better. Formally,
Definition 1. A cardinal comparison test is a sequence T := (Tt)t>0, where
Tt : (Ω×∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))
∞ −→ [0,1] is gt−measurable for all t > 0.
In words, for any t and any realization ω and any ordered pair of forecasting strategies f := ( f , g), the
tester, conditional on the induced t - history observed so far, announces his level of confidence that the first
forecaster (the one using f ) is better than the second one (we will interchangeably refer to this as his propensity
that f is superior to g). Note that announcing 0.5 means that both are equally capable (this should not be con-
fused with the statement that they are both capable or both incapable). Whenever Tt(ω, f ) = 1 (respectively,
0) the tester is confident that f outperforms g (respectively, g outperforms f ).
Definition 2. T is called anonymous if for all ω ∈ Ω∞, t > 0 and for all f , g ∈ F,
Tt(ω, f , g) = 1− Tt(ω, g, f ).
In words, the test’s propensity at each period should not depend on the expert’s identity. Note that whenever
f = g an anonymous test T must output a propensity of 0.5 for all ω ∈ Ω∞, t > 0.
For a given test T, an ordered pair of forecasting strategies f = ( f , g), and a realization ω we denote by
T (ω, f ) := l im
t→∞
Tt(ω, f ) whenever the limit exists. For ε ∈ (0,1) let L
f
T,ε
:= {ω : T (ω, f ) > ε}, be the set
of realizations for which the limit of T exists and from some time on assigns a propensity larger than ε to f
(similarly we denote R
f
T,ε
:= {ω : T (ω, f ) < ε}). Notice that the following is a straightforward observation
derived from Definition 2; If T is an anonymous test then ω ∈ R
( f ,g)
T,ε if and only if ω ∈ L
(g , f )
T,1−ε, we use the last
for some of our proofs.
When ω is in L
f
T,ε and ε > 0.5 the test eventually assigns a higher propensity to f than to g. On the other
hand, for ε < 0.5 the test assigns a higher propensity to g whenever ω is in R
f
T,ε. Thus, we will typically focus
on the sets L
f
T,ε with ε > 0.5 and on the sets R
f
T,ε for ε < 0.5.
2.2 Desirable Properties
In this section we introduce a set of axioms we deem desirable for a cardinal comparison test. Our first property
asserts that any set that is contained in R
f
T,εmust not be assigned a high probability according to f in comparison
with the probability assigned by g. In particular the ratio of this probabilities must be bounded by ε1−ε .
Definition 3. T is error-free if for all f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F, for all ε ∈ (0, 12) and for all measurable set A
f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) ≤ (
ε
1− ε
)g(A∩ R
f
T,ε) (1)
(Similarly, g(A∩ L
f
T,ε) ≤ (
1−ε
ε ) f (A∩ L
f
T,ε) for ε ∈ (
1
2 , 1)).
In words, the probability ratio assigned to the set A∩ R
f
T,ε according to the two forecasters should reflect
the propensity ratio assigned to them by the test. Note, in particular, as ε approaches zero the set R
f
T,ε captures
the paths where g is clearly deemed better than f and so the property of error-freeness implies that although g
may assign a subset of R
f
T,ε a positive probability, it must be the case that f must assign it near-zero probability.
On the other hand, whenever ε approaches 0.5 the corresponding ratio approaches 1 and so error-freeness
requires that f assigns that event a provability no grated than g.
In particular, each forecaster must believe that a test cannot point out the other forecaster as correct. From
her perspective, she is either preferred or the test is indecisive.
Consider a set of realizations assigned positive probability by one forecaster whereas her colleague as-
signs it a relatively small probability. We shall call a test ‘reasonable’ if the former forecaster assigns a positive
probability to the event that the test will eventually provide a high propensity to her. Formally:
Definition 4. We say that T is reasonable if for all f ∈ F × F, for all ε ∈ (0, 12 ) and for all measurable set A,
g(A)> 0 and f (A) < (
ε
1− ε
)g(A) =⇒ g(A∩ R
f
T,ε)> 0. (2)
(Similarly, f (A) > 0 and g(A)< (1−εε ) f (A) =⇒ f (A∩ L
f
T,ε) > 0 for ε ∈ (
1
2 , 1)).
Intuitively this is the reverse requirement of the previous axiom - the probability ratio assigned to some set
by the forecasters should be reflected in the results of the test. It should be emphasized that reasonableness and
error-free are not related notions, examples that these properties are independent will be discussed in Section
5.
Remark 1. One could propose to replace error-freeness with a stronger and more appealing property in which
a test points out the better informed expert. Informally, we would like to consider tests that have the following
property f (T (ω, f ) = 1) = 1 whenever f 6= g. However, there could be pairs of forecasters that are not equal
but induce the same probability distribution. In appendix A we formalize this and refer to tests that satisfy this
stronger requirement as an ideal. We, furthermore show, as the name suggests, that such tests essentially do
not exist.
3 An error-free and reasonable test
We now turn to propose an anonymous cardinal comparison test that is error-free and reasonable. For any pair
of forecasters, f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F, ω ∈ Ω∞, t ≥ 0, the finite derivative test, D, is defined as follows:
Dt+1(ω, f ) =


f (ωt )
f (ωt )+g(ωt) ,
1
2 ,
g(ωt)> 0 or f (ωt) > 0
other,
It should be noted that the ratio between Dt+1(ω, f ), the rank associated with the forecast f , and 1 −
Dt+1(ω, f ), the rank associated with the forecast g, equals the likelihood ratio between the two forecasters.
Clearly, D is anonymous. We turn to show it is reasonable and error-free. Before doing so, some preliminaries
are required.2
Lemma 1. Let f := ( f , g), Then the limit of Dt(ω, f ) exists and is finite f − a.s.
The proof relies on the results from ((Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017), Lemma 1), showing that the limit
of the likelihood ratio between the two forecasters exists and finite f − a.s.
Proof. For ω ∈ Ω∞ with f (ωt)> 0 define the likelihood ratio between the two forecasters at time t as
D t
f
g(ω) =
t∏
n=1
g((ω, f )n−1)[ωn]
f ((ω, f )n−1)[ωn]
,
and observe that Dt+1(ω, f ) =
1
1+D t
f
g(ω)
. Applying Lemma 1 from (Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017), we know
that the limit of D t
f
g, denoted Df g, exists and is finite f − a.s.. It readily follows that D(ω, f ) :=
1
1+Df g(ω)
:=
l im
t→∞
Dt(ω, f ) exists and is finite f − a.s.
Now that we have established the existence and the finiteness of the test D, let us prove it complies with
the two central properties for comparison tests:
Proposition 1. D is error-free.
Proof. Let f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F, ε ∈ (0, 12 ) and a measurable set A. From Lemma 1 the limit of Dt(ω, f ) exists
and finite f − a.s. Hence,
A∩ R
f
D ,ε = {ω ∈ A :
1
1+ Df g(ω)
∈ R
f
D ,ε} ⊂ {ω : Df g(ω) ≥
1− ε
ε
}.
Thus, applying ((Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017), Lemma 2, part b) we obtain
f (A∩ R
f
D ,ε) ≤ (
ε
1− ε
)g(A∩ R
f
D ,ε).
Similarly, by applying ((Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017), Lemma 2, part a) we show that g(A ∩ L
f
D ,1−ε) ≤
( ε1−ε ) f (A∩ L
f
D ,1−ε), and hence D is error-free.
Proposition 2. D is reasonable.
2 Notice that D is unaffected by the so called “counterfactual” predictions. These predictions are referred to events which may not
occur. On the contrary, the outcome of D depends only on predictions which made along the realized play path.
Proof. Let f ∈ F × F, ε ∈ (0, 12) and a measurable set A, and suppose (w.l.o.g) that
g(A) > 0 and f (A) < (
ε
1− ε
)g(A). (3)
Denote A1 := (A∩ L
f
D ,ε)∪ (A∩ {ω : D(ω, f ) = ε}), A2 := (A∩ R
f
D ,ε) and observe that A= A1 ∪ A2. Assume
by contradiction that g(A2) = 0 and notice that by the construction,
A1 ⊂ {ω : l im
t→∞
Dt(ω, f ) =
1
1+ Df g(ω)
≥ ε}.
Thus, applying ((Kavaler and Smorodinsky, 2017), Lemma 2, part a) together with g(A) = g(A1)we obtain that
f (A)≥ f (A1) ≥ (
ε
1−ε)g(A1) = (
ε
1−ε )g(A) which contradicts (3) and hence g(A2)> 0. By similar consideration,
using the anonymity of D, we show that f (A∩ L
f
D ,1−ε)> 0 and therefore D is reasonable.
3
Propositions 1 and 2 jointly prove our first main theorem:
Theorem 1. D is a anonymous, reasonable and error-free test.
We now turn to show that the finite derivative test is essentially the unique anonymous comparison that is
reasonable and error-free.
4 Uniqueness
Although there may be other error-free and reasonable comparison tests they are essentially equivalent to the
finite derivative test. To motivate this idea consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider the realization ω˜ := (1,1,1, ...), and two forecasters f and g, both using a coin to make
predictions. f uses a fair coin whereas g uses a biased coin with probability 1 for the outcome to be 1. Let
−→
ht1 be
the history of length t induced by (ω˜, f , g) and let
←−
ht1 be the one induced by (ω˜, g, f ). Let c > 1 and consider
the following test:
Tt(ω, f ) =


Dt(ω, f ),
1
1+c·D t
f
g(ω)
,
1− 1
1+c·D t
f
g(ω)
,
other
(ω, f )t =
−→
ht1
(ω, f )t =
←−
ht1 .
Hence, the propensities of T are differ from those provided by D only along the play paths
−→
h1 ,
←−
h1 , in which
case the limit of T converges slower to 1,0, respectively, than D.
Claim. T is an anonymous error-free and a reasonable test.
Proof. Let f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F, ε ∈ (0,1) and a measurable set A. Recall that f and ω˜ induce a unique play
path, (ω˜, f ). Thus, if (ω˜, f ) 6=
−→
h 1 and (ω˜, f ) 6=
←−
h 1 then by construction T (·, f ) ≡ D(·, f ), and therefore T is
error-free and reasonable as, by Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, D is alike.
3 In fact we show a stronger result: since f is monotone and R
f
D,ε =
⋃
ε¯∈Q∩(0,ε]
R
f
D,ε¯ it follows that, condition on f (A2) > 0 there exists
ε¯ < ε such that g(A∩R
f
D,ε¯) > 0. .
On the other hand, let ε ∈ (12 , 1) and assume (w.l.o.g) that (ω˜, f ) =
−→
h1 . Now, since D is error-free and
A\ ω˜∩ L
f
T,ε = A\ ω˜∩ L
f
D ,ε where g(ω˜) = 0 (as g induces a sequence of fair distributions along ω˜) we obtain
g(A∩ L
f
T,ε) = g(A\ ω˜∩ L
f
T,ε) = g(A\ ω˜∩ L
f
D ,ε) ≤ (
ε
1− ε
) f (A\ ω˜∩ L
f
D ,ε)≤ (
ε
1− ε
) f (A∩ L
f
T,ε).
For ε ∈ (0, 12 ) observe that Df g(ω˜) = 0 which implies that T (ω˜, f ) = 1 yielding ω˜ ∈ L
f
T,ε. Therefore, f (R
f
D ,ε) =
0, as f (ω˜) = 1 by construction, and hence inequality (1) is satisfied trivially. As a consequence, T is error-free.
To see why T is reasonable let ε ∈ (12 , 1) and observe that, if ω˜ ∈ A then the right hand side of condition (2)
is satisfied triviality as f (A∩ L
f
D ,ε) = 1. If, on the other hand, ω˜ /∈ A then, as before, A\ ω˜∩ L
f
T,ε = A\ ω˜∩ L
f
D ,ε,
and hence condition (2) is satisfied since D is reasonable. The proof for ε ∈ (0, 12 ) is analogous and hence
omitted. Finally, by construction, the anonymity of D implies the anonymity of T.
To capture the equivalency notion we introduce the following equivalence relation over tests;
Definition 5. Let f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F. We say that T∼ f Tˆ if
f ({ω : T (ω, f ) 6= Tˆ (ω, f )}) = g({ω : T (ω, f ) 6= Tˆ (ω, f )}) = 0.
We say that T ∼ Tˆ if and only if T ∼ f Tˆ for all f .
That is, two tests are equivalent if and only if, given an ordered pair of forecasting strategies there is zero
probability according to each forecaster that the tests will converge to different propensities.
Proposition 3. The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on ⊤ := {T : T − cardinal comparison test}.
The proof of Proposition 3 is relegated to Appendix B. The next theorem asserts that, up to an equivalence
class representative, there exists a unique anonymous reasonable and error-free test. That is, any anonymous
test T ≁ TD which is reasonable, admits an error. To this end, we will show that any T ≁ TD can be associated
with a pair of forecasting strategies for which the error-free condition fails. More importantly, the power of the
theorem stems from the premise that T admits an error at any pair f whenever T ≁ f D.
Before proceeding we make the observation that Definition 5 can be stated equivalently by the next lemma
which is invoked in our adjacent uniqueness theorem proof.
Lemma 2. Let f := ( f , g) ∈ F × F. Then T ∼ f Tˆ if and only if for all ε ∈ (0,1)∩Q
f ((L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
Tˆ ,ε
)∪ (L
f
Tˆ ,ε
∩ R
f
T,ε)) = g((L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
Tˆ ,ε
)∪ (L
f
Tˆ ,ε
∩ R
f
T,ε)) = 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is supplemented to Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let T be anonymous and reasonable test. If T ≁ D then T is not error-free.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that T is error-free. Let f := ( f , g) be such that T ≁ f D, then from Lemma 2
there exits ε ∈ (0,1) such that (w.l.o.g for f )
f ((L
f
D ,ε ∩ R
f
T,ε)∪ (L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
D ,ε)) > 0.
We shall consider the following cases which result in a contradiction.
Case 1; f (L
f
D ,ε ∩ R
f
T,ε)> 0. Assume that ε ∈ (
1
2 , 1) and observe that since L
f
D ,ε =
∞⋃
n∈N:n>⌈ 11−ε ⌉
L
f
D ,ε+ 1n
and f is
monotone with respect to inclusion there exist ε < ε1 such that f (Aˆ1 := L
f
D ,ε1
∩ R
f
T,ε) > 0. By Proposition 1, D
is error-free where Aˆ1 ⊂ L
f
D ,ε1
, hence
g(Aˆ1) ≤ (
1− ε1
ε1
) f (Aˆ1)< (
1− ε
ε
) f (Aˆ1).
In addition, by the assumption T is reasonable hence
f (Aˆ1 ∩ L
f
T,ε)> 0,
which yields a contradiction since R
f
T,ε, L
f
T,ε are disjoint sets.
For ε ∈ (0, 12 ) note that R
f
T,ε =
∞⋃
n∈N:n>⌈ 1ε ⌉
R
f
T,ε− 1n
, and so there exists ε2 < ε such that f (A2 := {L
f
D ,ε∩R
f
T,ε2
}) >
0. By the assumption T is an error-free test, hence
f (Aˆ2) ≤ (
ε2
1− ε2
)g(Aˆ1)< (
ε
1− ε
)g(Aˆ2).
In addition, by Proposition 2, D is reasonable hence
g(Aˆ2 ∩ R
f
D ,ε) > 0,
which yields a contradiction since R
f
D ,ε, L
f
D ,ε are disjoint sets.
Case 2: f (Aˆ3 := L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
D ,ε) > 0. Assume that ε ∈ (
1
2 , 1). By the assumption T is an error-free test where,
by Proposition 2, D is reasonable; therefore, the contradiction
g(Aˆ3 ∩ L
f
T,ε)> 0,
(as well as the case for which ε ∈ (0, 12)) follows analogously from Case 1 and hence omitted.
5 Independence of axioms
The notions of error-free and reasonableness which were introduced in Section 2.2 are not related; obviously,
the constant fair test, Tt(ω, f ) ≡ 1/2, is error-free and is not reasonable as inequality (1) is satisfied trivially
where the corresponding sets, R
f
T,ε, L
f
T,1−ε, are empty for all ε ∈ (0,
1
2). Using the result of Theorem 1 the next
example illustrates that reasonableness does not imply error-free.
Example 2. Let
−→
h2 and
←−
h2 be play paths composed of the realization ω˜ := (1,1,1, ...), and pairs of forecasts
along ω˜ which, from day two onward, are shown to have similar forecasts according to an iid distribution with
parameter 1. Whereas on day one, one forecast assigns 1 to the outcome 1, the other assigns half. Let
−→
ht2 ,
←−
ht2
be the uniquely corresponding induced t - history. Consider the following test:
Tt(ω, f ) =


Dt(ω, f ),
0,
1,
other
(ω, f )t =
−→
ht2
(ω, f )t =
←−
ht2 .
Claim. T is anonymous and reasonable but is not error-free.
Proof. Since D is anonymous and Tt(ω, f , g) = 1 − Tt(ω, g, f ) whenever (ω, f )
t equals
−→
ht2 or
←−
ht2 , it follows
that T is anonymous. Further, let f˜ = ( f˜ , g˜) be such that (ω˜, f˜ ) =
−→
h2 . Since {ω˜} = L
f˜
T,ε for all ε ∈ (0,
1
2) one
has
g˜({ω˜} ∩ L
f˜
T, 34
) =
1
2
>
1
3
f˜ ({ω˜} ∩ L
f˜
T, 34
)
and hence T is not error-free. To verify that T is a reasonable test note that the right hand side of condition
(2) is satisfied for f˜ regardless of ε as f˜ ({ω˜}) = f˜ ({ω˜} ∩ L
f˜
T,ε) = 1 (as well as g˜({ω˜}) = g˜({ω˜} ∩ R
f˜
T,ε) = 1 is
satisfied for ( g˜, f˜ )). Consequently, since by Proposition 3, D is a reasonable test the result follows.
(Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2008) introduce an alternative cardinal comparison test:
Lt(ω, f , g) =


0,
0.5,
1,
g(ωt)
f (ωt ) > 1
other
g(ωt)
f (ωt )
< 1.
Note that this test differs from D whenever the likelihood ratio is high(low) but finite. In our case the test
does not decisively prefer any expert but yields a propensity which depends on the proportional ratio whereas
the likelihood ratio test, L, does.4
Claim. L is anonymous and reasonable and is not error-free.
Proof. Let g be a forecasting strategy which deterministically predicts ω˜, and let f be such that it predicts
(1− ε) at day one and meets g from day two onward regardless of any past history. Let 0 < ε < 1 and note
that whenever f is assumed to be the true measure then Lt(ω˜, f , g) =
1
1−ε > 1 for all t > 0 and so expert g is
determinstically ranked by 1 along (ω, f ). A simple calculation shows that by taking ε˜ = 1−3ε1−ε one has
f (ω˜∩ R
−→
f
L,ε˜
) ≥ 1− ε >
1− ε
2
= (
ε˜
1− ε˜
)g(ω˜∩ R
−→
f
L,ε˜
)
as g(ω˜) = 1. Since ε is taken arbitrarily, not only L is not error-free but it admits an arbitrarily large error. The
fact that L is reasonable follows directly from Proposition 3.
6 Decisiveness in finite time
In this section we provide a natural sufficient conditions for which a tester achieves a higher level of confidence
in favor of the informed forecaster with any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time. To this end, we
4 A different existing test, which was introduced in (Feinberg and Stewart, 2008), is the cross-calibration test which is discussed in
the introduction. However, it turns out that this test does not naturally induce a cardinal comparison test; Rather than ranks the
experts this test outputs a binary verdict (pass/fail) for each of the two experts separately and hence rules out anonymity. More
over, it can be shown that any cardinal comparison test which naturally ranks an expert according to its empirical frequency would
fail to be reasonable if an expert, who had calibrated only along one profile and had failed along all others, is tested against an
informed expert who, due to (Dawid, 1982), passes the cross calibration test.
show the existence of a uniform bound on the rate at which a test converges. Consider expert f ′s point of view.
Not only should he maintain that, whenever expert g ’s forecasts are different from his than he should eventually
be ranked higher then him, but if expert g ’s forecasts are sufficiently far than this should essentially happen
uniformly fast. Indeed, as we show in this section, this holds for our finite derivative test. This observation
tightly builds on a theory of active supermartingales due to (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992).
To determine whether a test is ‘almost’ certain about a forecaster requires the two forecasters to provide
significantly different forecasts as captured by the following definition:
Definition 6. A pair of forecasting strategies f := ( f , g) is ε− close along ω at period t > 0, if
| f ((ω, f )t−1)[ωt]− g((ω, f )
t−1)[ωt]| < ε.
The next theorem asserts that, given an arbitrarily small ε > 0, there exists a finite uniform bound, K ,
which is independent of any pair of forecasting strategies, such that if the forecasts of the uninformed experts
are sufficiently differ from those of the informed one in more than K periods, then the finite derivative test, D,
will eventually settle on the informed expert with high level of confidence. In the later scenario, it furthermore
surprisingly asserts that, given any sufficiently large time n, Dn ranks the informed expert more than (1− ε)
and up to ε - amount of accuracy as he would have ranked had he continued to rank the expert following his
test to infinity.
Theorem 3. For all 0< ε < 1 there exists K = K(ε) such that for all f := ( f , g), and for all n> 0, there is a set
which probability according to f is at least (1− ε) such that for any ω in that set:
1. Either f is ε− close along ω in all but K periods in {1...n} or
2. ω ∈ L
f
D ,1−ε. Furthermore, |Dt(ω, f )−Dn(ω, f )| < ε, ∀t ≥ n.
In words, with high probability, given any sufficiently large n and any sufficiently small ε, the only reason
that the tester is not ‘almost’ settled on the correct forecaster at finite time n is because the uninformed expert
made excellent predictions along the play path. The power of the theorem stems from that fact that the bound
on the number of times in which the two experts’ forecasts must be differed, K , for the finite derivative test to
rank the informed one higher, solely depends on the required level of accuracy, ε, and is independent of any
pair of forecasting strategies, f .
The proof of Theorem 3 is relegated to Appendix B, nevertheless let us briefly provide some technical
intuition. At the heart of the proof of Theorem 3 lies a theorem due to regarding the rate of decrease of active
supermartingales. Consider an abstract setting with a probability measure P in∆(Ω∞) and a filtration {gt}
∞
t=1.
Definition 7. An (gt) - adapted, real-valued process D˜ := {D˜t}
∞
t=0 is called a supermartingale under P if
1. E|D˜t | <∞ for all t > 0.
2. E[D˜t |gs] ≤ D˜s, for all s ≤ t, P − a.s.
Intuitively, a supermartingale is a process that decreases on average. The proof of Theorem 3 implies that the
finite derivative test is associated, among others, with a supermartingale property with respect to the natural
filtration which is defined in Section 2. Let us further consider the following class of supermartingales called
active supermartingales. This notion has been first introduced in (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992) who study
reputations in infinitely repeated games:
Definition 8. A non-negative supermartingale D˜ is active with activity ψ ∈ (0,1) under P if
P({ω : |
D˜t(ω)
D˜t−1(ω)
− 1|>ψ}|ω˜k−1) >ψ
for P - almost all histories ω˜t−1 such that D˜t−1(ω˜)> 0.
In word, a supermartingale has activity ψ if the probability of a jump of size ψ at time t exceeds ψ for
almost all histories. Note that D˜ being a supermartingale, is weakly decreasing in expectations. Showing that
it is active implies that D˜t substantially goes up or down relative to D˜t−1 with probability bounded away from
zero in each period. (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992), Theorem A.1, showed the following remarkable result.
Theorem 4 ((Fudenberg and Levine, 1992)). For every ε > 0, ψ ∈ (0,1), and 0< D
−
< 1 there is a time K <∞
such that
P({ω : sup
t>K
D˜t(ω) ≤ D
−
}) ≥ 1− ε
for every active supermartingale {D˜t} with D˜0 ≡ 1 and activity ψ.
Theorem 4 asserts that if D˜ is an active supermartingale with activity ψ then there is a fixed time K by
which, with high probability, D˜t drops below D
−
and remains below D
−
for all future periods. It should be noted
that the power of the theorem stems from the fact that the bound, K , depends solely on the parameters ε > 0, ψ
and D
−
, and is otherwise independent of the underlying stochastic process P.
We exploit the active supermartingale property in a different way. In the context of comparison testing, we
consider two strategies, one for each expert, which are updated using Bayes rule. Given sufficiently small ε > 0,
our comparative test ranks an expert depending on whether the posterior odds ratio is above or below ε. The
active supermartingale result implies that there is a uniform bound (independent of neither the length of the
game nor the true distribution) on the number of periods where the uninformed expert can be substantially
wrong without being detected, such that if this bound is exceeded, the probability that the tester ranks high
the uninformed expert is small.
7 Concluding remarks
The paper proposes a normative approach to the challenge of comparing between two forecasters who repeat-
edly provide probabilistic forecasts. The paper postulates three basic norms: anonymity, error-freeness and
reasonableness and provides a cardinal comparison test, the finite derivative test, that complies with them. It
also shows that this test is essentially unique. Finally, due to a novel linkage with a class of supermartingales
called actives, it shows that the test converges uniformly fast and hence is meaningful in finite time. In the
future we hope to extend our results to settings with more than two forecasters and study alternative sets of
norms.
7.1 Implications
The approach taken in this paper can be considered as a contribution to the hypothesis testing literature in
statistics where a forecaster is associated with a hypothesis. In this context we propose a hypothesis test that
complies with a set of fundamental properties which we refer to as axioms. In contrast, a central thrust for the
hypothesis testing literature (for two hypotheses) is the pair of notions of significance level and power of a test.
In that literature one hypothesis is considered as the null hypothesis while the other serves as an alternative. A
test is designed to either reject the null hypothesis, in which case it accepts the alternative, or fail to reject it (a
binary outcome). The significance level of a test is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis whenever it
is correct (type-1 error) while the power of the test is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis assuming
the alternative one is correct (the complement of a type-2 error).
In contrast with the aforementioned binary outcome that is prevalent in the hypothesis testing literature we
allow, in addition, for a wide variety of propensities outcomes. Recall the celebrated Neyman-Pearson lemma
which characterizes a test with the maximal power subject to an upper bound on the significance level. The
possibility of an inconclusive outcome, in our framework, allows us to design a test where both type-1 and
type-2 errors can be reduced arbitrarily.5
Interestingly, the test proposed in the Neyman-Pearson lemma, similar to ours, also hinges on the likelihood
ratio.6 In our approach we, a priori, treat both hypotheses symmetrically. In the statistics literature, however,
this is not the case and the null hypothesis is, in some sense, the status quo hypothesis. This asymmetry is
manifested, for example, in the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
Note that in order to design a test that complies with a given significance level and a given power one
must know the full specification of the two hypotheses. This is in contrast with our test which is universal, in
the sense that it does not rely on the specifications of the two forecasts. Finally, let us comment that whereas
hypothesis testing is primarily discussed in the context of a finite sample, typically from some iid distribution,
our framework allows for sequences of forecasts that are dependent on past outcomes as well as past forecasts
of the other expert.
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APPENDIX
A On ideal tests
Recall that an error-free test eliminates the necessity of pointing out the less informed expert. A stronger and
more appealing property is to point out the better informed expert, in which case the tester eventually settles on
one forecaster as being better than the other. We consider tests that exhibit such a property as ideal. Formally,
Definition 9. T is decisive on f at (ω, f ) (respectively, g) if Tt(ω, f ) −→ 1 (respectively, (1− Tt(ω, f )) −→ 1).
For a given T, f , we denote by
A
f
T, f
:= {ω : T is decisive on f at (ω, f )},
to be the measurable set of realizations (in L
f
T,ε,ε ∈ (0,
1
2)) for which T is decisive on f at (ω, f ).
Definition 10. A test T is ideal with respect to A⊆ F if for all f := ( f,g 6= f ) ∈ A× A.
f (A
f
T, f
) = g(A
f
T,g) = 1.
It is called ideal if it is ideal with respect to F.
In other words, whenever the left expert knows the actual data generating process and right expert does
not, an ideal test will surely identify the informed expert.
Trivially, any ideal test with respect to a subset of forecasts A is also error-free with respect to the same
set. Notwithstanding, the converse does not follow. Whenever the measures induced by the two forecasters
are mutually absolutely continuous, then an error-free test is not guaranteed to identify the better informed
expert. Formally,
Proposition 4. Let f := ( f , g) be such that f (6= g)≪ g. If T is anonymous and error-free then
f (A
f
T, f
)< 1.
On a set of realizations that has probability one according to forecaster f it is not necessarily the case that
the test will identify him as better informed.
Proof. Assume that f (A
f
T, f
) = 1, hence
f ((A
f
T, f
)c) = 0.
Since g ≪ f it follows that g((A
f
T, f
)c) = 0 and so g(A
f
T, f
) = 1 which, by the anonymity of T, contradicts the
assumption that T is error-free.
The following is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 4.
Corollary 1. There exists no ideal test with respect to a set of forecasts A whenever it contains two forecasts which
induce measures, one of which is absolutely continuous with respect to the other.
This immediately entails:
Corollary 2. There exists no ideal test.
However, whenever A contains no such pair of forecasts, then an ideal test does exist. To prove this we must
first accurately define the notion of mutually singular forecasts.
Definition 11. Two forecasting strategies, f = ( f , g 6= f ) ∈ F, are said to be mutually singular with respect to
each other, if there exist two disjoint sets
C
f
f
,C fg ⊂ (Ω×∆(Ω)×∆(Ω))
∞,
such that
f ({ω : (ω, f ) ∈ C
f
f
}) = g({ω : (ω, f ) ∈ C fg }) = 1.
A set A⊆ F is pairwise mutually singular if for all f = ( f , g) 6= f ) ∈ A, f , g are mutually singular with respect
to each other.7
The next lemma asserts that a reasonable test is able to perfectly distinguish between far measures which
are induced from forecasting strategies which are mutually singular with respect to each other.
Lemma 3. Let f , g 6= f ∈ F which are mutually singular with respect to each other. If T is reasonable then
f (A
f
T, f
) = g(A
f
T,g) = 1.
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to Appendix B. It should be noted that Lemma 3 holds even for T which is
not error-free.
The next theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an ideal test over sets.
Theorem 5. There exists an ideal test with respect to A if and only if A is pairwise mutually singular.
Proof. ⇐= Directly follows from Lemma 3 and Proposition 2.
=⇒Let T be an ideal anonymous test with respect to a set A. Let f := ( f , g 6= f ) ∈ A× A and denote
C Tf := {(ω, f ) :ω ∈ A
f
T, f
}, C Tg := {(ω, f ) :ω ∈ A
f
T,g}.
Since A
f
T, f
, A
f
T,g are disjoint, it follows that C
T
f
, C Tg are disjoint where T ideal yields
f ({ω : (ω, f ) ∈ C Tf }) = f (A
f
T, f
) = g(A
f
T,g) = g({ω : (ω, f ) ∈ C
f
g }) = 1.
We conclude the section with an example of an ideal test over a domain of mutually singular forecasts:
7 We remind the reader that f induces a unique play path (ω, f ).
Example 3. Let
Aiid × Aiid := { f := ( f , g) : ∃a f ,ag ∈ [0,1] s.t f (ω
t)[1] ≡ a f , g(ω
t)[1] ≡ ag , ∀ω ∈ Ω
∞},
and for ω ∈ Ω∞ denote the average realization by
aω := l im
t→∞


t∑
n=1
1{ωn=1}
t

 .
Let f ∈ Aiid × Aiid such that a f 6= ag and observe that for any ω
aω = a f ⇐⇒ l im
t→∞
D t
f
g(ω) = 0 ⇐⇒ l im
t→∞
Dt(ω, f )) = 1, f − a.s.
Hence, since the induced measures f , g are iid with different parameters it follows from the law of large
numbers that
f (A
f
D , f
) = 1 and g(A
f
D , f
) = 0,
showing that D is ideal with respect to Aiid .
B Missing proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Since for allω ∈ {T 6= Tˆ} there exists ε ∈ (0,1)∩Q such that either Tˆ (ω, f )< ε < T (ω, f )
or T (ω, f ) < ε < Tˆ (ω, f ) we have
{Tˆ < T} =
⋃
ε∈(0,1)∩Q
{Tˆ < ε < T} =
⋃
ε∈(0,1)∩Q
(L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
Tˆ ,ε
) (A.1)
as well as
{Tˆ > T} =
⋃
ε∈(0,1)∩Q
{T < ε < Tˆ} =
⋃
ε∈(0,1)∩Q
(L
f
Tˆ ,ε
∩ R
f
T,ε). (A.2)
⇐=Assume by contradiction that T ≁ f Tˆ and observe that since {T 6= Tˆ} = {Tˆ < T} ∪ {Tˆ > T} it follows
that (w.l.o.g. for f ) either f ({Tˆ < T}) > 0 or f ({Tˆ > T}). If f ({Tˆ < T}) > 0 then the most right equality of
(A.1) implies that there exists ε′ ∈ (0,1) ∩Q such that f (L
f
T,ε′
∩ R
f
Tˆ ,ε′
) >0 yielding a contradiction (similarly
whenever f ({Tˆ < T}) > 0).
=⇒ Assume by contradiction that (w.l.o.g for f ) f ((L
f
T,ε′
∩R
f
Tˆ ,ε′
)∪(L
f
Tˆ ,ε′
∩R
f
T,ε′
)) > 0 for some ε′ ∈ (0,1)∩Q.
Therefore, either f (
⋃
ε∈(0,1)∩Q
(L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
Tˆ ,ε
)) > 0 or f (
⋃
ε∈(0,1)∩Q
(L
f
Tˆ ,ε
∩ R
f
T,ε)) > 0. In which case, using (A.1) and
(A.2), we conclude that f ({Tˆ < T} ∪ {Tˆ > T}) > 0 which contradicts the assumption that T ∼ f Tˆ .
Proof of Proposition 3. Let T, T1, T2 ∈ ⊤, f ∈ F × F
Reflexivity: Applying Lemma 2 it readily that f (L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
T,ε) = g(L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
T,ε) = 0 as L
f
T,ε,R
f
T,ε are disjoint sets
for all ε ∈ (0,1). Thus, T ∼ f T.
Anonymity: From Lemma 2 we obtain that for all ε ∈ (0,1)∩Q,
T1 ∼ f T2 ⇐⇒ f ((L
f
T1 ,ε
∩ R
f
T2,ε
)∪ (L
f
T2 ,ε
∩ R
f
T1,ε
)) = g((L
f
T1 ,ε
∩ R
f
T2,ε
)∪ (L
f
T2 ,ε
∩ R
f
T1,ε
))
= f ((L
f
T2 ,ε
∩ R
f
T1,ε
)∪ (L
f
T1 ,ε
∩ R
f
T2,ε
)) = g((L
f
T2 ,ε
∩ R
f
T1,ε
)∪ (L
f
T1 ,ε
∩ R
f
T2,ε
))
⇐⇒ T2 ∼ f T1.
Transitivity: Suppose by contradiction that T1 ∼ f T, and T ∼ f T2 where T1 ≁ f T2. Then from Lemma 2 (wl.o.g
for f ) we are provided with ε¯ ∈ (0,1) such that
f ((L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2 ,ε¯
)∪ (L
f
T2 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T1,ε¯
)) > 0,
where for all ε ∈ (0,1),
T1 ∼ f T =⇒ f ((L
f
T1 ,ε
∩ R
f
T,ε)∪ (L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
T1 ,ε
)) = 0,
T ∼ f T2 =⇒ f ((L
f
T,ε ∩ R
f
T2,ε
)∪ (L
f
T2 ,ε
∩ R
f
T,ε)) = 0.
(A.3)
Case 1: f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
) > 0. Note that,
f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2 ,ε¯
) =
= f ((L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ L
f
T,ε¯)∪ (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ (L
f
T,ε¯)
c))
= f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ L
f
T,ε¯) + f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ R
f
T,ε¯) + f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ {T = ε¯}).
Thus, if f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ L
f
T,ε¯) > 0 then f (R
f
T2 ,ε¯
∩ L
f
T,ε¯) > 0, which contradicts the second condition of (A.3),
otherwise if f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T2,ε¯
∩ R
f
T,ε¯) > 0 then f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T,ε¯) > 0, which contradicts the first condition of (A.3).
Otherwise, f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩R
f
T2,ε¯
∩{T = ε¯}) > 0 implies that f (L
f
T1 ,ε¯
∩{T = ε¯}) > 0. In addition, since {L
f
T1,ε¯+
1
n
}n>⌈ 11−ε¯ ⌉
is increasing to L
f
T1 ,ε¯
and R
f
T,ε¯ ⊂ {R
f
T,ε¯+ 1n
} for all n, it follows that there exists a sufficiently large n′ and ε′ = ε¯+ 1n′
such that f (L
f
T1 ,ε
′ ∩ R
f
T,ε′
) > 0, which again contradicts the first condition of (A.3).
Case 2: f (L
f
T2 ,ε¯
∩ R
f
T1,ε¯
) > 0. The contradiction follows analogously from Case 1 and hence omitted.
Lemma 4. If T is reasonable then for all f and ε ∈ (12 , 1) and a measurable set A
f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) > 0 =⇒ g(A∩ R
f
T,ε)> 0.
(similarly for g where ε ∈ (0, 12 )).
Proof. Let f ,ε ∈ (12 , 1) and a measurable set A, and (w.l.o.g) assume by contradiction that
f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) > 0 =⇒ g(A∩ R
f
T,ε) = 0.
Since 0 = g(A∩ R
f
T,ε) < (
1−ε
ε ) f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) and T is reasonable (2) yields that f (A∩ R
f
T,ε ∩ L
f
T,ε) > 0, which
contradicts the fact as R
f
T,ε, L
f
T,ε are disjoint sets.
Proof of Lemma 3. W.l.o.g. let A be such that: f (A) = 1, g(A) = 0 let ε ∈ (12 , 1). Assume that f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) > 0,
T is reasonable, therefore applying Lemma 4 with the set A yields
g(A∩ R
f
T,ε) > 0
which contradicts the assumption that g(A) = 0. Hence, f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) = 0. On the other hands, since the left
hand side of condition (2) is satisfied trivially for A, we are provided with f (A∩ L
f
T,ε) ≥ f (A∩ L
f
T,ε) > 0. As a
result,
1= f (A) = f (A∩ R
f
T,ε) + f (A∩ L
f
T,ε) + f (A∩ {T = ε})
and therefore f (A∩ L
f
T,ε1.01
) = 1. Similarly, assuming that f (B) = 0, g(B) = 1 we obtain that g(R
f
T,ε0.99
) = 1 for
all ε ∈ (0, 12 ). Since A
f
T, f
⊂ L
f
T,ε for all ε ∈ (
1
2 , 1) and L
f
T,ε is decreasing in as ε→ 1 (as the partition is refined)
it follows that f (A
f
T, f
) = f (
⋂
ε
L
f
T,ε) = 1 and the result follows.
B.1 decisiveness in finite time
The proof of Theorem 3 is generalized to the case where the number of elements, |Ω|, is arbitrary and it is relied
on achieving a uniform bound on the up-crossing probability of any non-negative supermartingale which admits
sufficiently (finite) many fluctuations.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let ε ∈ (0,1). We will show that there exists a uniform constant K = K(ε) such that on
the set of histories, ωt , of f − probabili t y − (1− ε) and for all n> 0, only two scenarios are possible; either,
if ∃(t i)
K+1
i=1
⊂ {1, ...,n} and ∃(̟ti )
K+1
i=1
⊂ ΩK+1 such that
| f ((ω, f )ti−1)[̟ti ]− g((ω, f )
ti−1)[̟ti ]| ≥ ε, ∀1≤ i ≤ K+1 then, the limit of D is strictly grater than (1−ε),
and more importantly, the value of D at time n, Dn, is ε− close to all ranks from time n onward, or, in all other
scenarios, | f ((ω, f )t−1)[̟]− g((ω, f )t−1)[̟]| < ε, ∀̟ ∈ Ω in all but K periods t in {1, ...,n}.
construction of the faster process As in (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992), define an increasing sequence of stopping
times {τk}
∞
k=0
relative to {D t
f
g} and ε inductively as follows. First set τ0 = 0 and if τk−1(ω) =∞ set τk(ω) =
∞. Ifτk−1(ω) <∞ set τk(ω) to be the smallest integer t > τk−1(ω) such that either
f (ωt−1)> 0 and f ({ω¯ ∈ Ω∞ : |
D t
f
g(ω¯)
D t−1
f
g(ω¯))
-1|>
ε
|Ω|
}| ωt−1}) >
ε
|Ω|
(A.4)
or
D t
f
g(ω)
D
τk−1
f
g(ω)
− 1≥
ε
2|Ω|
. (A.5)
If there is no such t, set τk(ω) =∞. Now define the process {D˜k}
∞
k=0
by D˜k = D
τk
f
g if τk <∞ and D˜k = 0 if
τk =∞.
Now, From (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992), Lemma 4.1, (D t
f
g(ω) :=
f (ωt )
g(ωt) )t>0 is a supermartingale, hence
from standard result the process {D˜k}
∞
k=0
is a supermartingale. Furthermore, by (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992),
Lemma 4.3, {D˜k}
∞
k=0
is an active supermartingale with activity ε
2|Ω|
.
Applying Theorem 4 with ε, |Ω|, acitivi t y = ε2|Ω| , and D˜0 ≡ 1, there exists an integer K = K(ε) > 0
(depending only on these variables) such that for any active supermartingale {D˜k} with activity
ε
2|Ω|
, one has
f (sup
k>K
D˜k < ε) > 1− ε. (A.6)
In addition, by (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992), Lemma 4.2, if | f ((ω, f )t)[̟] − g((ω, f )t)[̟]| > ε, for
some̟ ∈ Ω then condition (A.4) holds. Consequently, the process {D˜k}
∞
k=0
takes into account all observations
where | f ((ω, f )t)[̟]− g((ω f )t)[̟]| > ε for some̟ ∈ Ω and omits only the observations where
| f ((ω, f )t)[̟]− g((ω, f )t)[̟]| ≤ ε ∀̟ ∈ Ω (although, by condition (A.5), not necessarily all of them).
As a result, under the assumption that expert f is truthful (meaning, the realization are generated via f ),
there exists a constant K = K(ε), which does not depends on the true process f or the forecasting strategy g,
so that on the set of histories, ωt , of probability (1− ε) under f , in all but K periods either
| f ((ω, f )t)[̟] − g((ω, f )t)[̟]| ≤ ε ∀̟ ∈ Ω or D t
f
g(ω) < ε. Now assume that there exist K + 1 periods
(t i)
K+1
i=1
⊂ {1, ...,n} and (̟ti )
K+1
i=1
⊂ ΩK+1 such that
| f ((ω, f )ti−1)[̟ti ]− g((ω, f )
ti−1)[̟ti ]| ≥ ε, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ K + 1 with f (ω
ti−1) > 0 and let n > K + 1. Then
equation (A.6) ensures us that with f − probabili t y − (1− ε)
D˜K+1 = D
τK+1
f
g < ε (A.7)
where by condition (A.5) for any t ≥ n≥ τK+1 we obtain that either D˜t drops bellow ε or
D t
f
g(ω) < D
τK+1
f
g(ω)(1+
ε
2
)< ε(1+ ε) (A.8)
and hence it cannot exceed ε(1+ ε).
We conclude that there exists a constant K , which does not depend on the forecasting strategies f , g, such
that for any sufficiently large n > K , with f - probability - (1− ε); if there exist K + 1 periods in which f and
g are slightly different above ε along a play path then the likelihood ratio at any point t after n never exceed
ε(1+ ε).
Now from (A.7) and (A.8) we conclude that with f - probability - (1− ε); either
| f ((ω, f )t−1)[̟]− g((ω, f )t−1)[̟]| < ε, ∀̟ ∈ Ω
in all but K periods t in {1, ...,n}, or
1−
ε(1+ ε)
1+ ε(1+ ε)
=
1
1+ ε(1+ ε)
<
1
1+ D t
f
g(ω)
= Dt(ω, f ) ≤ 1, ∀t ≥ n, (A.9)
and as a result, the liminf of D is always greater than 1−
ε(1+ε)
1+ε(1+ε)
. Further more, inequality (A.9) yields that
1−
ε(1+ ε)
1+ ε(1+ ε)
< |Dn(ω, f )−Dt(ω, f )| ≤ 1, ∀t ≥ n
and so |Dn(ω, f ) − Dt(ω, f )| <
ε(1+ε)
1+ε(1+ε) , ∀t ≥ n, which, together with the first scenario, holds with f -
probability - (1− ε). Since
ε(1+ε)
1+ε(1+ε)
< ε the result follows.
C The cross-calibration test
We now restate the cross-calibration test as suggested by (Feinberg and Stewart, 2008). Fix a positive integer
N > 4 and divide the interval [0,1] into N equal closed subintervals I1, ..., IN , so that I j = [
j−1
N ,
j
N ], 1≤ j ≤ N .
All results in their paper hold when [0,1] is replaced with the set of distributions over any finite set and the
intervals I j are replaced with a cover of the set of distributions by sufficiently small closed convex subsets. At
the beginning of each period t = 1,2, ... all forecasters (or experts) i ∈ {0, ..,M − 1} simultaneously announce
predictions I it ∈ {I1, ..., IN }, which are interpreted as probabilities with which the outcome 1 will occur in
that period. We assume that forecasters observe both the realized outcome and the predictions of the other
forecasters at the end of each period.
The cross-calibration test is defined over sequences (ωt , I
0
t , ..., I
M−1
t )
∞
t=1, which specify, for each period t,
the outcome ωt ∈ Ω, together with the prediction intervals announced by each of the M forecasters. Given
any such sequence and any M - tuple l = (Il0 , ..., IlM−1 ) ∈ {I1, ..., IN }
M , define ζlt = 1I it=Ili ,∀i=0,...,M−1
, and
νlt =
t∑
n=1
ζln, where ν
l
t represents the number of times that the forecast profile l is chosen up to time t. For
νl
t
> 0, the frequency f l
t
of outcomes conditional on this forecast profile is given by
f lt =
1
νlt
t∑
n=1
ζlnωn.
Forecaster i passes the cross-calibration test at the sequence (ωt , I
0
t , ..., I
M−1
t )
∞
t=1 if
l imsup
t→∞
| f lt −
2l i − 1
2N
| ≤
1
2N
for every l satisfying l im
t→∞
νlt =∞.
In the case of a single forecaster, the cross-calibration test reduces to the classic calibration test, which
checks the frequency of outcomes conditional on each forecast that is made infinitely often. With multiple fore-
casters, the cross-calibration test checks the empirical frequencies of the realization conditional on each profile
of forecasts that occurs infinitely often. Note that if an expert is cross-calibrated, he will also be calibrated.
